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5.1 Introduction
Over the past three decades productivity
growth in European countries has gradually
weakened despite some recovery after recessions
and crises. Productivity growth has therefore
become a central cause for concern about pros-
pects for future growth in living standards across
Europe. Especially when US productivity growth
accelerated in the mid-1990s, the lack of a similar
development across most of Europe stood out
(Timmer et al., 2010). Between 1995 and 2005,
GDP per hour worked increased at an average
annual rate of 2.5% in the United States compared
with 1.4% in the EU-15, the countries that were
members of the European Union before 2004.1
Since the mid-2000s, US labor productivity
growth has been similarly stuck in lower gear. Be-
tween 2006 and 2015, US labor productivity grew
at an average annual rate of 1.1%,while labor pro-
ductivity growth in the EU-15was only 0.7%. The
Global Financial Crisis (GFC) depressed produc-
tivity growth in part for cyclical reasons. Howev-
er, as the productivity slowdown started well
before the GFC, around 2005, there are good rea-
sons to assume there have been other structural
factors at work, including a long-term shortfall
of investment (Cette et al., 2016; Fernald et al.,
2017) and major business and societal challenges
translating digital technology into productivity
growth (van Ark and O’Mahony, 2016).
One strand of literature has focused on the
declining effectiveness of the overall innovation
process, which shows signs of having become
both more difficult and more expensive, so that
a slowdown in productivity may be unavoidable
even in the medium term (Bloom et al., 2018).
Others have argued that the productivity effects
1 The Conference Board Total Economy Database, November 2018, https://www.conference-board.org/data/
economydatabase/.
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of new technology have so far primarily
benefited global frontier firms, while other firms
have lagged increasingly behind (Andrews et al.,
2016; Riley and Bondibene, 2018). However,
much of the recent uneven effects of technology
on growth may just be temporary as suggested,
for example, by Harberger (1998) who distin-
guishes between a random “mushroom-type”
and a broad-based “yeast-like” phase of produc-
tivity improvements across industries. Such
ideas are not out of line with the more systemic
thinking from the evolutionary school of eco-
nomics about sociotechnological paradigm
changes. For example, Perez (2002) distinguishes
between the installment and the deployment
phases of new technologies with distinctly
different growth and productivity effects.
So far, most of the analysis of the recent
changes in productivity dynamics has been con-
ducted at the aggregate level. This chapter em-
ploys the latest available 2017-version of the EU
KLEMS database to examine these trends more
closely by focusing on the characteristics of indus-
tries and their relative productivity growth per-
formance. A more detailed analysis at industry
level can help to detect some of the causes of the
slowdown, as well as possible signals of a recov-
ery in specific industries of the economy. We
distinguish industries by their intensity of usage
of information and communication technology
(ICT), intangible capital, degree of offshoring,
skill levels, and the average age of their work-
forces. We consider industry productivity mea-
sures until 2015 for an aggregate of 12 European
countries, that cover both the largest economies
and different regions of Europe, and we provide
a more detailed analysis for 9 of these countries.
The United States is also included in this analysis
as a comparator.
First we include a brief overview of the EU
KLEMS database, its history and methodology,
and explanations of the sector groupings. This is
followedby anoverviewof output andproductiv-
ity growth performance at the aggregate economy
level, followed by a more detailed analysis of the
performance in the goods versus market services
sectors of the economy.We then look at the perfor-
mance of industries that have been characterized
as intensive users on the basis of our taxonomies
to detect differences in productivity growth across
the European countries and the United States as
well as between the first period (1995e2005) and
the second period (2006e15) in our analysis. We
conclude this chapter with a brief summary of
what we know so far, and what next steps the
research on the productivity slowdown needs to
take, including the issues around improved mea-
surement of productivity in the digital age.
5.2 The EU KLEMS database
5.2.1 A brief history of EU KLEMS
If one was to go back over two decades to the
mid-1990s, both the policy concerns regarding
economic growth and the evidence base were
primarily concerned with unemployment and
low labor force participation. The defining
feature of the decade starting from 1995dthe
significant impact of ICT on growthdwas only
hinted at in a handful of firm-based studies
(e.g., Brynjolfsson and Hitt, 1996). The aggregate
growth implications of ICT were not understood
at the time. Evidence on the key role of high-level
skills acquisition was only beginning to emerge
in the academic literature and therefore higher
education was not high on the policy agenda.
Intangible investments were hardly mentioned
and were seen as too difficult to measure, while
again the focus in the literature was on firm-
specific intangibles such as brand development
rather than on their macroeconomic importance.
Going forward 5 years to the end of the cen-
tury, in the context of accelerating productivity
growth in the United States, some key papers
emerged that argued for a significant impact of
ICT on growth (Jorgenson and Stiroh, 2000; Oli-
ner and Sichel, 2000) and that ICT had radically
altered the demand for different types of labor in
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favor of those with university-level education
(Autor et al., 1998). Policy makers began to focus
much more on productivity and growth in the
light of these findings. However, these earlier pa-
pers were based on data for the United States
and it soon became apparent that the informa-
tion base required to investigate sources of
growth in Europe was not up to the task. There
then followed a concerted research effort, mostly
financed by the European Commission Frame-
work Programmes, to redress this information
deficiency. Using the framework developed by
Dale Jorgenson and co-authors, summarized in
Jorgenson et al. (1987), EU KLEMS was born.
TheEUKLEMSproject2 aimed to produce long
time series by sector on outputs, inputs, and pro-
ductivity for all EU countries using a harmonized
methodology, at the (NACE revision 1) industry
level. It produced some data series for all EU-25
countries, covering the time period 1970e2007
for up to 70 industries, although the time period,
industry detail, and input measures varied by
country. It brought together data from national
accounts and other official sources such as firm-
and individual-level surveys to produce long
time series on outputs, inputs, and productivity
by country and industry. The database enabled
a decomposition of sources of growth into vol-
umes and types of labor (skills), quantities and
types of capital (ICT and non-ICT), and total fac-
tor productivity (TFP). Details of the methodol-
ogy and main results were summarized in
O’Mahony and Timmer (2009). The database sub-
sequently went through a number of revisions, in
particular changing the industrial classification to
NACE revision 2, and updates to 2015 for some
larger economies.
The economic context in which the database
was developed was that, for the macro economy,
there was a catching-up process in labor produc-
tivity in the EU relative to the United States dur-
ing the postwar period from the 1950s to the
mid-1990s, after which the United States forged
ahead. The EU KLEMS database was designed
to facilitate research behind these aggregate fig-
ures, focusing especially on the industry location
of these trends, the sources of differences be-
tween the United States and EU (input use or
productivity), and cross-country variation. The
highlights of the original EU KLEMS work
were the findings that the EU productivity gap
with the United States was concentrated in mar-
ket service sectors and that ICT was key to
explaining the labor productivity growth gap
(see van Ark et al., 2008; Timmer et al., 2010).
Over time national statisticians and academics
in other countries expressed interest indeveloping
similar approaches to that in EU KLEMS. This led
to the setup of the World KLEMS consortium,
which includes all participants in EU KLEMS
and partners fromChina, India, Russia, and coun-
tries in Asia, Africa, and Latin Americad40 part-
ners in total (Jorgenson et al., 2016).
Since 2008, the EU KLEMS database has been
updated a few times. The most comprehensive
revision was done in 2016 and 2017, switching to
data based on the new European System of Na-
tional Accounts (ESA10), with data covering the
period until 2015. The new data, also available
fromwww.euklems.net, provide a unique oppor-
tunity to analyze productivity growth for the to-
tal economy and two major sectors in the
economy (goods-producing and market services)
and cover 12 European economies. Taken
together those 12 economies, which include
Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark,
Germany, Finland, France, Italy, the Netherlands,
Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom andwill
be named the EU-12, accounted for 90% of the
European Union’s nominal GDP in 2015.
A preliminary analysis of the data showed that
the slow productivity growth, which had been
visible in most market services in the decade
before, had broadened to the goods-producing
2 www.euklems.net coordinated by the University of Groningen, the Netherlands.
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sector for most European economies since the
crisis. The manufacturing sector was particularly
hard hit by the GFC and had only partially recov-
ered by 2015. The slowing growth trend is driven
by a triple combination of modest recovery in
employment growth, stagnant growth in capital
input, and a further weakening in the TFP growth
trend (van Ark and J€ager, 2017). In this chapter
we extend the analysis by looking at various in-
dustry taxonomies to improve on our prelimi-
nary diagnosis of the productivity slowdown,
and to use the EU KLEMS data set to pinpoint
the main factors accounting for the slowdown.
5.2.2 Growth accounting and
methodology
To assess productivity growth at the industry
level,we rely on themethodof growthaccounting.
Thismethodhas a longhistory,with afirst system-
atic exposition in Jorgenson et al. (1987) and dis-
cussed in more detail in the setting of EU
KLEMS in Timmer et al. (2010). Hulten (2010) pro-
vides a survey of the growth accounting literature,
which includes a discussion of industry growth
accounting and a broader discussion on what is
and what is not measured in growth accounting.
We proceed here with a brief exposition. We
assume an industry in a country at a particular
point in time can be characterized by a produc-
tion function exhibiting constant returns to scale
(suppressing country and industry subscripts for
brevity):
Yt ¼ AtFðKt;Lt;MtÞ: (5.1)
Output Y is produced using (Hicks-neutral) tech-
nology A and the inputs are capital K, labor L,
and inputs of energy, materials, and services
Mt. Assuming Eq. (5.1) takes a translog form
and assuming that inputs are paid their marginal
products, we can compute productivity growth
as the change in output that is not accounted
for by changes in inputs using the following pro-
ductivity growth index:
Dlog At ¼ Dlog Yt  wKt Dlog Kt  wLt Dlog Lt
 wMt Dlog Mt:
(5.2)
Here DlogAthlogAt  logAt1 is the change
operator, wXhp
XX
pYY is the costs of using input X,
pXX, relative to total revenues pYY, and the up-
per bar denotes the two-period average input





Especially when the aim is to assess the contri-
bution of industries to aggregate growth or, as
below, to growth of a group of industries, it is
more convenient to work with a value-added
measure of productivity growth. We take the
value-added volumes Vt from the National Ac-
counts and compute value-added based produc-
tivity as:
Dlog AVt ¼ Dlog Vt  sKt Dlog Kt  sLt Dlog Lt:
(5.3)
The growth of capital input and of labor input
is now weighted using the share of input costs in
value added, sXt h
pXX
pVV. This, in effect, means we
move to the value-added production function,
rather than the gross output production function
from Eq. (5.1), assuming that this production
function is separable between intermediate and
other inputs.
A key feature of the EU KLEMS database is
that inputs of capital and labor are not homoge-
nous, but instead represent a variety of different
types of capital and labor, such as buildings and
computers for capital and low-skilled and high-
skilled workers for labor.3 To reflect the different
types of capital and labor input requires a
straightforward extension from Eq. (5.3), where
there are m ¼ 1, ., M types of capital input
3 See J€ager (2018) for more details.
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and n ¼ 1, ., N types of labor input that each
earn their marginal products:









The industry productivity growth rates as
computed based on Eq. (5.4) can be aggregated
using the share of each industry i in aggregate







vitDlog AVit : (5.5)
Note that Eq. (5.5) can be applied for any combi-
nation of industries, a key feature in our analysis,
below.
While the methodology underlying the EU
KLEMS database is, by now, standard, the
implementation is far from standardized. Na-
tional statistical offices in many European coun-
tries do not routinely publish productivity
accounts. In addition, there are a variety of
methods employed to estimate real inputs, espe-
cially capital that requires assumptions on the
rates and patterns of depreciation. This leads to
difficulties in international comparisons of sour-
ces of growth. The EU KLEMS project set out to
produce productivity accounts using interna-
tionally comparable methods and data sources.
In the most recent version of the EU KLEMS
database, concepts and methodologies to calcu-
late the various growth and productivity vari-
ables were adjusted to the new European
System of National Accounts (ESA10) in which
the asset boundary was expanded by including
research and development as intellectual prop-
erty assets (J€ager, 2018). Capital stock figures
are mostly obtained from Eurostat and are thus
consistent with national accounts assumptions
on the measurement of capital stock, rather
than being fully harmonized. These, plus other
adjustments, imply that the latest release is not
directly comparable to earlier versions of EU
KLEMS. Therefore, in this chapter we only
report results from 1995 to 2015.4
5.3 Industry taxonomies
Based on our preliminary observations about
the possible causes of the productivity slow-
down in the past 2 decades, we summarize the
industry productivity results using a series of
taxonomies, whereby the growth calculations
are carried out for groups of industries that share
common characteristics. These taxonomies are
based largely on the intensity of use of various
types of inputs. The taxonomies are as follows.
ICT intensity: In previous studies during the
1990s and early 2000s, the performance of
industry productivity has often been compared
on the basis of the level of intensity of investment
or capital services in information and com-
municationebased hardware and software.
This research showed that ICT-intensive indus-
tries typically tended to show significantly faster
labor productivity growth. However, in contrast
to US industries, European industries tended to
reveal lower impact from greater ICT intensity
on TFP growth (Stiroh, 2002; van Ark et al.,
2003). Recently the nature of digital technology
has shifted from relying primarily on ICT assets,
such as hardware and telecommunication equip-
ment, toward spending on ICT services. The
latter refers to data storage and information pro-
cessing services (including cloud computing),
computer systems design, other information
4 For some countries, the start date of the new measures are a few years after 1995dthis is indicated in the tables.
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services (including Internet publishing), and the
usage of data, storage, and communication.5 The
data are obtained from supplyeuse tables pub-
lished as part of the World Input-Output Data-
base (www.wiod.org), described in Timmer
et al. (2016). Comparing ICT intensity, including
those services, to the original ICT assets-only
classification reveals a distinctly different taxon-
omy because ICT hardware has diminished as a
share of value added in the past decade while the
use of data services has increased, especially in
service sectors of the economy (van Ark, 2016).
Intangibles intensity: This industry taxon-
omy comprises the aggregate of intangibles as-
sets and distinguishes innovative property
intensive and economic competency intensive,
as explained below. Organizational changes
and other forms of intangible investments,
such as workforce training and other economic
competencies, have long been seen as necessary
to benefit from the adoption of new technology
(Bresnahan et al., 2002; Bertschek and Kaiser,
2004). The pioneering work of Corrado et al.
(2005, 2009) allows the measurement of these as-
sets divided into three categories: computerized
information, innovative property, and economic
competencies. Computerized information coin-
cides with computer software, which is already
included in ICT capital. Innovative property re-
fers to the innovative activity built on a scientific
base of knowledge as measured not only by con-
ventional R&D statistics but also by innovation
and new products and processes more broadly
defined, including new architectural and
engineering design, mineral exploration, and
new products development costs in the financial
industry. Economic competencies include
spending on strategic planning, worker training,
redesigning or reconfiguring existing products
in existing markets, investment to retain or
gain market share, and investment in brand
development. The industry divisions are based
on the data available from the INTAN Invest
platform.6 Recent work has highlighted the
importance of intangible capital in explaining
productivity growth in advanced economies
(Corrado et al., 2017).
Skill intensity: Industries can also be classi-
fied on the basis of the proportion of workers
with a university degree. The skill-biased tech-
nical change literature shows that the wage of
the highly skilled is positively associated with
technological changes (Autor et al., 1998).
High skills have been widely regarded as com-
plementary to ICT in generating productivity
improvements. However, as the technology
has becomemore mature, there is some evidence
that high skills are less in demand than
previouslydfirms investing in innovation create
opportunities for improving conditions of a
wider group of workers. For example, Aghion
et al. (2017) argue that low-skilled workers
employed in high-tech UK companies enjoy a
higher wage premium compared not only to
other low-skilled workers but also to the highly
skilled.
Age profile of workers: This taxonomy is
based on the proportion of workers aged 50
and over. The relationship between age and cre-
ative performance has been found to follow a
hump-shaped profile in many studies using
individual-level data. However, this finding
needs to be treated with some caution as this
type of analysis may be subject to many endoge-
neity and selection biases (Frosch, 2011). For
example, educational attainment tends to be
lower for older workers which may result in a
spurious negative correlation between
5 More precisely, computer services refer to the following detailed industries in the North American Industry Clas-
sification System (NAICS): data processing, hosting, and related information services (NAICS 51820 and 51913) and
computer systems design services and related computer services (NAICS 54152, 54153, and 54159).
6 See www.intaninvest.net.
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innovative performance and age. Also, more
mature and less innovative firms tend to attract
fewer younger workers. Correcting for these
biases using firm-level data tends to shift the
age-productivity curve toward older workers
(G€obel and Zwick, 2012). Nevertheless, there re-
mains a negative link beyond a certain age
(Jones, 2010).
Both the skill taxonomy and the age taxon-
omy are based on tabulations from the European
Labour Force Survey. The skill taxonomy relies
on proportions of the workforce who have uni-
versity degrees or equivalents and the age taxon-
omy on proportions of the workforce who are
aged 50 or over. These data are consistent with
the divisions of the workforce by gender, age,
and skill that underlie the EU KLEMS labor
composition measures.
Offshore intensity: The final classification of
industries concentrates on the usage of interme-
diate inputs and is based on the share of industry
intermediate inputs sourced from abroad.
Buying inputs from abroad can be an important
source of productivity growth, for instance,
because they embody new technologies (Keller,
2004) and are thus of higher quality or because
new, imported varieties of inputs suit different
needs than domestically produced versions.
For individual firms, the evidence seems clear
that importing more of its inputs improves pro-
ductivity (e.g., Goldberg et al., 2010; Halpern
et al., 2015). The degree of “offshoring intensity”
is based on theWorld Input-Output Database, as
described in Timmer et al. (2016). It measures
how much an industry relies on foreign interme-
diate inputs in its production. This can be
approached in different ways, since the inputs
of industry’s suppliers may also be partly
sourced abroad. For example, Timmer et al.
(2013, 2014) use share of value added created
domestically versus abroad. We adopt a simpler
approach, focusing only on the first-stage of the
value chain, that is, the degree to which an in-
dustry directly sources its inputs from abroad.
Choosing this measure over measures that also
capture upstream foreign sourcing is unlikely
to have a substantial impact on the results: all
manufacturing industries score high on our mea-
sure, as well as agriculture, mining, transport
and storage, and motor vehicle and fuel
distribution.
To employ the taxonomies for an analysis of
productivity, we need to make a delineation be-
tween more and less intensive industries in
terms of input usage, offshoring, and other tax-
onomies. For this purpose, industries were iden-
tified as 0 or 1 depending on whether they
belonged to the bottom or top half, respectively,
of the industries in terms of their intensities. For
example, the most intensive ICT-using industries
are those with the highest share of value of ICT
investment plus purchases of ICT services as a
percentage of “synthetic output” (which is value
added at industry level plus the intermediate
use of those ICT services) in at least four of
seven countries for which data were readily
available (Finland, France, Germany, Italy,
the Netherlands, Sweden, and the United
Kingdom). The intangible, skill, age, and offshor-
ing intensities were also based on being above
the median of industries for a minimum of four
countries out of nine countries (the countries
above as well as Austria and Spain).7
Table 5.1 summarizes the different taxon-
omies that we use for the 1-digit market econ-
omy industries. The taxonomies on intangibles,
skills, and age are not readily available at a
greater level of detail than this 1-digit level,
while the ICT and offshoring taxonomies are
available at the 2-digit level in most cases. For
1-digit industries with more detailed taxon-
omies, we show the fraction of the 1-digit
7 In the cases of ICT and offshore intensities, there was more information available for subindustries, so that the
average of 0 and 1 for all subindustries was used.
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industry that is classified as “intensive” accord-
ing to this criterion based on the number of un-
derlying 2-digit industries.
The table shows that the intensive industries
included in the taxonomies show some overlap,
but there are substantial differences too. For
example, the ICT taxonomy corresponds closely
to the skills and the intangibles taxonomies,
though there are notable differences between
these. The age taxonomy, which is based on the
share of workers aged 50 and over, tends to high-
light those industries that are not highlighted in
the other taxonomies, such as agriculture and
transportation and storage. This is to be expected
as age is picking up a factor that is likely to lead
to lower performance, whereas the other
taxonomies focus on higher-performing indus-
tries. Most taxonomies point at the aggregate
manufacturing sector as an intensive sector,
except for skill and age. The more detailed ICT
intensity classification signals that more than a
quarter of manufacturing industries are not
ICT-intensive. The information and communica-
tion sector, finance and insurance, and business
services are intensive on ICT usage, intangibles,
and skills but not for offshoring or age. For intan-
gibles, we find that some sectors that did not
score on innovation properties did show up for
economic competencies: these include wholesale
and retail trade, arts/entertainment/creation,
and other personal and household services. In
contrast, mining and utilities which scored as
TABLE 5.1 Taxonomies of industries: Market Economy.
ICT Intan InProp EcComp Offshore Skill Age
Agriculture, forestry, and fishing 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
Mining 0 0 1 0 1 0 1
Manufacturing 0.73 1 1 1 1 0 0
Electricity, gas, and water 1 0 1 0 1 1 1
Construction 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
Wholesale and retail trade 0.67 1 0 1 0.33 0 0
Transportation and storage 0.50 0 0 0 0.50 0 1
Hotels and restaurants 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Information and communication 1 1 1 1 0 1 0
Finance and insurance 1 1 1 1 0 1 0
Business services 1 1 1 1 0 1 0
Arts, entertainment, and recreation 1 0 0 1 0 1 0
Other services 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
Household services 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
Notes: Industries were identified as 0 or 1 depending on whether they belonged to the bottom or top half, respectively, of the industries in terms
of their intensities. In the cases of ICT and offshore intensities, there was more information available for subindustries, so that the average of
0 and 1 for all subindustries was used. The market economy excludes industries mostly in the public sector (education, health, and public
administration) and real estate, due to well-known issues in measuring output in these sectors. The table shows whether an industry is classified
as intensive according to each criterion. Intan: intangible capital; InProp: innovative properties; EcComp: economic competencies. Fractions
indicate that more detailed industries are divided between intensive and nonintensive. Information on intangibles, skill, and age are not
available below the level of detail shown in the table.
Sources: see text.
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intensive sectors on the basis of innovative prop-
erties dropped out on the basis of economic com-
petencies. The one industry that stands as being
not intensive across all taxonomies is hotels and
restaurants: it is the only industry that is not ICT-
intensive, not intangibles-intensive, not skills-
intensive, not prone to offshoring and not
employing a relatively old workforce.
In sum, the differences between the taxon-
omies should provide enough scope for differ-
ences in average growth for each classification.
Yet the similarities also make clear that any
(mono-)causal discussion is not warranted, as
there are multiple factors that influence produc-
tivity growth and there is no silver bullet that im-
pacts productivity growth beyond all else.
5.4 Aggregate growth accounting
Before turning to the productivity results by
industry taxonomy, we consider trends in out-
puts and inputs for aggregate economic activity.
Table 5.2 summarizes value added growth and
labor productivity (value added per hour
worked) growth for an EU aggregate based on
12 countries,8 compared to the United States. Be-
tween 1998 and 2005, average growth in real
value added for both the total economy and
the market economy in the United States was
about 40% faster than in the EU-12. In the decade
since 2005, both regions have witnessed a signif-
icant drop in aggregate output growth. The
slowdown was partly due to the GFC, but
when excluding the most critical years of the
crisis (2008e10) and examining the period since
2011, output growth in both the United States
and EU-12 was about half of that achieved
from 1995 to 2005. Similar trends are observable
for labor productivity growth. Both regions
experienced a large drop in productivity growth
during the second period, and the average labor
productivity growth for the United States drop-
ped almost to the EU-12 level for both the aggre-
gate and the market economy. Strikingly, the
slowdown in productivity for the United States
shows no sign of any significant recovery in
the most recent years, to 2017.9
Fig. 5.1A and B shows contributions from
hours worked and labor productivity to output
TABLE 5.2 Aggregate growth in real value added
and labor productivity, average % per
annum.
Total economy Market economy
1998e2005 2006e15 1998e2005 2006e15
Value Added
EU-12 2.1 0.9 2.3 0.8
United States 2.9 1.3 3.1 1.2
Labor Productivity (value added per hour)
EU-12 1.4 0.7 1.7 0.8
United States 2.5 0.8 3.1 1.0
Notes: The 12 EU economies include Austria, Belgium, Czech
Republic, Denmark, Germany, Finland, France, Italy, the
Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. The EU
KLEMS-based growth rates for the total economy results can be
slightly different from official estimates as reported in the National
Accounts of individual countries or in data sets such as Penn World
Tables or the Total Economy Database, as the EU KLEMS growth
rates are aggregated up from a sector level, and can therefore be
affected by slightly different weighting.
Source: EUKLEMS, 2017, euklems.net.
8 Taken together those 12 economies, which include Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Germany, Finland,
France, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom, named EU-12, account for 90% of the Eu-
ropean Union’s nominal GDP in 2015.
9 See https://www.conference-board.org/data/economydatabase/.
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growth for the nine largest EU economies sepa-
rately for the aggregate and market economy,
respectively.10 For the EU-12, hours worked
growth rates were slower in the 2006e15 period
than during the 1998e2005 period, whereas in
the US, hours for the total economy increased
at about the same rate during both periods and
even slightly improved for the market economy.
However, the slump in labor productivity
growth, which occurred in both regions, was
much more pronounced for the United States
than for Europe even though US productivity
growth remained marginally higher than in the
EU-12 during the 2006e15 period. Similar pat-
terns emerge for most of the individual Euro-
pean countries shown in the diagram with
weakening hours and productivity growth rates
during the latest period. In Germany and Swe-
den, the growth in hours worked was higher in
the later period and hours worked growth also
held up well for the United Kingdom, but for
all three economies there was a slowdown in la-
bor productivity growth. The main exception is
Spain, where labor productivity growth declined
in the earlier period but rose in the later period
and vice versa for hours worked which is largely
due to the greater exposure of the Spanish econ-
omy to boom-and-bust cycles, especially in con-
struction and tourism.
The slowdown in labor productivity growth
can partly be explained by reductions in the
extent of capital deepening, defined as the
growth in capital services per hour worked.
Fig. 5.2A and B illustrates the significant slump
in this measure, for the EU-12 group, individual
EU countries, and the United States. The slow-
down in capital deepening was most pro-
nounced in the United Kingdom and the
United States which had seen the fastest in-
creases in capital intensity during the earlier
period. Overall the period since the financial
crisis is one of widespread reduced investment
in capital per worker hour.
Finally, we consider growth rates of TFP.
Fig. 5.3A and B shows TFP growth rates for the
same time periods and country/region groups
as in the previous charts. These figures show a
much weaker TFP growth than was evident for
labor productivity. In many countries TFP
growth was either negative or almost zero in
the second period. Countries that experienced
the highest growth rates in the earlier period,
Finland, the United Kingdom, and the United
States, have shown the greatest drop since.
Only Germany experienced a slight improve-
ment in TFP growth across the two time periods
for both the total and the market economy
although at relatively low values. Also Spain,
which already had experienced negative TFP
growth during the 1996e2005 period, saw that
deterioration somewhat lessening during the
later period.
In summary the review of the labor produc-
tivity, capital deepening, and TFP metrics for
the aggregate and market economy highlights
that Europe and the United States entered a
period of much slower productivity growth
from the mid-2000s and that there is little evi-
dence of a recovery after the crisis. Before exam-
ining growth according to the industry
taxonomies, we first consider TFP growth rates
dividing the market economy into goods pro-
duction and market services. Timmer et al.
(2010) highlighted the importance of market ser-
vices as drivers of growth (in the United States)
and slowdown (in most European economies)
during the decade from 1995 to 2005, when
ICT had its greatest impact on output and labor
productivity growth, and arguably also on TFP
growth through the use of this technology.
10 For the remainder of the analysis in this chapter, we have excluded separate analysis of three of the smaller Eu-
ropean economies (Belgium, Czech Republic, and Denmark) for which up-to-date estimates are available, which are
included with the EU-12 aggregate.
























































































































































































































AT FI FR DE IT NL ES SE UK US
(A)
(B)
FIGURE 5.2 (A) Growth in Capital per Hour Worked, Total Economy, % per annum. (B) Growth in Capital per Hour
Worked, Market Economy, % per annum.

















































































































































































































































AT FI FR DE IT NL ES SE UK EU-12 US
(A)
(B)
FIGURE 5.3 (A) Growth in Total Factor Productivity, Total Economy, % per annum. (B) Growth in Total Factor Produc-
tivity, Market Economy, % per annum.
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Table 5.3 shows TFP growth by these major
sectors. From 1995 to 2005, TFP growth in the
market services sector was much slower than
in the goods sector. However, the slowdown
during the second period was less dramatic for
market services than for manufacturing. In mar-
ket services, the growth in TFP was moderately
positive in the earlier period in most countries,
with the exception of Germany, Italy, and Spain.
Market services productivity was especially
strong in Finland and the United Kingdom. In
the later period TFP growth in market services
fell to very low numbers or became negative,
with the exception of the Netherlands.
TFP growth fell much faster in goods produc-
tion, but the rates remained largely positive,
although in this case the Netherlands and the
United Kingdom were showing negative rates.
In the United States the TFP decline in the goods
sector was also surprisingly strong from 3.5%
from 1995 to 2005 to 0.9% from 2006 to 15. How-
ever, these observations hide the significant
swings in goods-sector productivity over the
past decade. For example, van Ark and O’Mah-
ony (2016) showed that manufacturing TFP
growth in the EU-12 dropped from 2.4% be-
tween 2002 and 2007 to 1% during the most
critical recession years from 2008 to 2010 and
recovered modestly to 0.9% from 2011 to 2015.
In market services, signs of recovery have been
limited so far. Therefore the later period cannot
be characterized as one in which the market ser-
vices sector helped to offset the productivity
collapse in the goods sector of the economy.
5.5 Growth by sector characteristics
In order to get to a better diagnosis of what
have been the key reasons behind the recent pro-
ductivity dynamics and how to understand
differences across countries and sectors, we
have introduced a range of taxonomies to clas-
sify and distinguish industries in EU KLEMS.
As a starting point, it is helpful to first analyze
the growth experience of the United States be-
tween 1998 and 2005 using these taxonomies.11
As discussed in the previous section, productiv-
ity growth in the United States stood out relative
to the EU in this first period, as growth was sub-
stantially faster than beforedor since (Byrne
et al., 2016).
Table 5.4 shows the TFP growth rates for the
overall market economy and the breakdown in
groups of industries according to the different
characteristics. Market economy TPF in the
United States grew at a rate of 1.4% on average
over the 1998e2005 period. Industries producing
TABLE 5.3 Total factor productivity growth in
Market Services and Goods Production,
% per annum.
Market services Goods
1995e2005 2006e15 1995e2005 2006e15
Austria 0.9 0.0 1.9 1.4
Finland 2.1 0.3 4.3 0.3
France 0.2 0.7 2.4 0.9
Germany 0.3 0.3 2.1 1.1
Italy* 0.4 0.7 0.0 0.1
Netherlands* 1.1 0.7 1.3 0.5
Spain 1.9 0.7 1.3 1.2
Sweden* 1.0 0.1 3.2 0.4
United Kingdom 1.6 0.2 1.4 0.2
EU-12* 0.2 0.1 1.3 0.7
United States* 0.8 0.0 3.5 0.9
*Note: Netherlands 2000e05; EU-12 and United States 1998e2005
instead of 1995e2005; Italy and Sweden 2005e14 instead of 2005e15.
Source: EUKLEMS (2017), euklems.net.
11 For most countries, the latest EU KLEMS release provides data since 1995 (or earlier), but for the United States 1998
is the starting year.
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ICT goods and services, which include produc-
tion of semiconductors, computers, and telecom-
munication equipment on the goods side and the
information and communication industries on
the services side, show the fastest TFP growth
compared to other groups at 6.0%, substantially
higher than the average TFP growth for the mar-
ket economy as a whole.
ICT-using industries cover the industries that
make the most intensive use of ICTs. Unlike
earlier ICT classifications, which identified ICT
intensity based only on the use of ICT hardware
and software capital, the new taxonomy also in-
corporates information on use of ICT services as
intermediate inputs. This aims to capture that
firms are increasingly outsourcing ICT activities:
rather than maintaining servers and building
dedicated software, they purchase access to
data centers and cloud-based software services.
As Table 5.4 shows, the group of ICT-using
industries contributed positively to high produc-
tivity growth in the United States until 2005,
slightly above the market sector average.12
The three intangible assets taxonomies also
show that the most intangible-intensive indus-
tries exhibited faster productivity growth than
industries that invested less in intangible assets.
As shown in Table 5.1, industries scoring high on
“intellectual properties” are different from those
with high scores on “economic competencies,”
yet growth of either grouping exceeds market
economy growth. This highlights that industries
that are in neither groupingdagriculture, con-
struction, transportation and storage, and hotels
and restaurantsdshowed particularly low pro-
ductivity growth in the United States between
1998 and 2005.
The offshoring taxonomy highlights the pro-
ductivity performance of industries which have
intensively offshored parts of their production
process. The relatively high growth in this
grouping illustrates that market services were
not the only factor in strong US productivity
growth during the 1998e2005 period but that
globalization played an important role as well.
The two labor-taxonomies highlight that in-
dustries that were intensive in usage of high skill
levels, and especially of experienced workers
over the age of 50 years, were not showing a pro-
ductivity advantages over industries that did
not. One common feature is that these taxon-
omies both omit manufacturing and wholesale
and retail trade. The age-based taxonomy shows
a particularly stark result in that TFP growth for
industries with relatively many older workers in
the United States was below zero.
The discussion so far shows that intensive ICT
usages, intangibles. and offshoring were key
contributors to the relatively strong TFP growth
performance of the market sector in the United
States between 1998 and 2005. Yet the more
TABLE 5.4 Average annual total factor productivity











Note: Productivity growth for various taxonomies indicate
productivity growth rates of industries that were characterized as
above median for all industries for that specific group. ICT,
Information and communication technology.
Source: EUKLEMS, 2017, euklems.net.
12 Most industries that are classified as ICT-intensive according to the new “assets þ services” framework were also
ICT-intensive according to the old asset-based framework.
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pressing questions that motivate this chapter are
whether we can use these taxonomies to find a
common thread in the productivity performance
across European countries and the United States
and what factors explain the slowdown after
2005.
Table 5.5 aims to answer the first question,
comparing the performance of TFP growth
across countries and taxonomies over the full
period for the European countries and the
United States, sorted by average growth in the
market economy (first column) and subse-
quently for the different taxonomies. Over the
full period, most of the countries show average
annual TFP growth between 0 and 1%, and
with the United States not in an exceptional po-
sition relative to the European economies. How-
ever, the variation in productivity growth
between European countries is substantial, espe-
cially when considering the decline in productiv-
ity in Spain and Italy for most groups on the one
hand, and the average TFP growth of 1.6% in
Finland, as well as strong TFP growth numbers
across the groups, on the other hand.13
However, there are some common features in
terms of the performance of different groups be-
tween the countries. In all countries, the indus-
tries that are investing more in intangibles, and
particularly in intangibles related to economic
competencies, show faster productivity growth
than the aggregate for the market economy. In
most countries, the ICT-intensive industries
also show faster productivity growth than the
market economy as a whole, whereas the differ-
ences are less pronounced for intangible-
intensive industries. Conversely, the skill-intensive
TABLE 5.5 Average annual total factor productivity growth in Europe and the United States, 1995e2015 (%).
Market ICT Intangibles InProp EcComp Offshore Skill Age
Spain 0.6 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.6 0.6
Italy 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.7 0.6
France 0.2 0.1 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.6 0.3 0.5
Germany 0.5 0.4 0.6 0.4 0.5 1.2 0.7 0.6
Netherlands 0.6 0.5 1.0 0.4 0.9 0.0 0.6 0.3
United States 0.7 0.8 1.1 1.1 0.9 0.8 0.6 0.1
United Kingdom 0.7 0.9 1.3 1.1 1.2 0.3 1.3 0.8
Austria 0.8 0.9 1.0 1.0 0.9 0.6 0.6 0.9
Sweden 0.9 1.2 1.7 1.3 1.5 0.6 0.3 0.8
Finland 1.6 1.6 2.2 2.0 2.1 1.0 1.3 0.8
Correlation with market economy 1.0 0.96 0.93 0.91 0.93 0.73 0.79 0.44
Notes: The table shows average annual total productivity growth for the group of industries identified in the column heading; see Table 1 for the
composition of the industry groups. Market, Market economy; ICT, Information and communication technology; InProp, Innovative properties;
EcComp, Economic competencies. The period covered is shorter in Italy (1995e2014), the Netherlands (2000e15), Sweden (1995e2014), and the
United States (1998e2015).
Source: EUKLEMS, 2017, euklems.net.
13 Much of the strong productivity growth in Finland during the 1995e2005 period was because of a strong “Nokia
effect” in this relatively small economy.
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industries and those that employ relatively older
workers tend to growmore slowly, or even show
declining productivity such as for older-
workereintensive industries in Italy, Spain, the
Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and Sweden.
Finally, as indicated by the correlations in the
bottom row of the table, the cross-country pat-
terns of productivity growth in ICT-intensive
and in intangible-intensive industries corre-
spondmost closely to the overall growth pattern,
suggesting that these industries are most impor-
tant for characterizing the growth differences
across countries.
Table 5.6 addresses the second question,
namely the slowdown in productivity growth
in most countries after 2005. The first column
highlights that TFP growth slowed down be-
tween the first and second period in all countries,
except Germany and Spain. In most countries
the slowdown was in the order of 1 percentage
point or more. The degree to which the change
in growth for the individual taxonomies
corresponds to the change in aggregate growth
is smaller than the correspondence of growth
rates in Table 5.5. For example, in approximately
half the countries (Sweden, France, the United
Kingdom, the United States, and Germany), the
slowdown was smaller or the same in ICT-
intensive industries compared to the aggregate,
while in the other half of countries (Finland,
Austria, the Netherlands, Italy, and Spain), the
slowdown was larger. The clearest pattern can
be seen in industries that invest most intensively
in economic competencies and in industries that
are offshoring more intensively. The productiv-
ity slowdown in industries that invest most
intensively in economic competencies is less
severe than for the aggregate in nearly all coun-
tries, while the slowdown in offshoring-intensive
industries is larger than for the aggregate in all
countries. The more severe slowdown in
offshoring-intensive industries could point to
the importance of the broad slowdown in global
trade in recent years and the possible impact of a
TABLE 5.6 Change in average annual total factor productivity growth: 2005e15 versus 1995e2005.
Market ICT Intangibles InProp EcComp Offshore Skill Age
Finland 2.6 3.1 3.2 3.7 3.1 3.1 2.2 1.4
Sweden 1.7 1.3 1.3 1.4 1.2 3.0 0.1 1.9
United Kingdom 1.4 1.3 1.1 1.8 1.0 1.5 2.2 3.0
United States 1.3 1.4 1.6 1.3 1.4 2.0 0.4 0.3
France 1.2 1.0 0.9 1.2 1.0 1.8 0.8 1.6
Austria 0.8 1.0 0.5 0.9 0.5 1.2 1.0 1.6
Netherlands 0.7 0.9 0.5 1.3 0.6 1.4 1.0 2.2
Italy 0.1 0.3 0.2 0.0 0.2 0.7 0.1 1.2
Germany 0.1 0.6 0.3 0.6 0.3 1.0 1.9 1.5
Spain 0.6 0.8 0.3 0.9 0.3 0.2 1.3 0.9
Correlation with market economy 1.00 0.84 0.96 0.84 0.96 0.92 0.47 0.17
Notes: The table shows the change in average annual productivity growth before and after 2005 for the group of industries identified in the
column heading; see Table 1 for the composition of the industry groups. Market: Market economy; ICT, Information and communication
technology; InProp, Innovative properties; EcComp, Economic competencies. The period covered is shorter in Italy (1995e2014), the Netherlands
(2000e15), Sweden (1995e2014), and the United States (1998e2015).
Source: EUKLEMS, 2017, euklems.net.
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defragmentation of global value chains on pro-
ductivity growth (Timmer et al., 2016). This
would be another sign that firms are exploiting
fewer cost reductions from foreign sourcing
and specialization.
5.6 Summary and conclusions
Productivity research since the GFC has
shown that the productivity slowdown of the
past decade or so started well before the crisisd
around 2005. However, the recession has exacer-
bated the productivity crisis which most econo-
mies have experienced because of slowing
demand, weak investment, and structural rigid-
ities in product, labor, and capital markets (van
Ark and J€ager, 2017). In addition, while creating
new business models and applications, the com-
plex characteristics of the New Digital Economy,
characterized by the combined shifts to mobile
technology, cloud computing and storage, and
ubiquitous access to broadband, have created
important challenges in how to leverage these
new technologies to drive productivity growth
(van Ark, 2016).
In this chapter we adopted a series of industry
taxonomies to detect more precisely the possible
causes of differences in productivity growth be-
tween European countries and the United States,
and the slowdown in productivity growth since
2005. Our findings confirm insights from the
literature that the degree of investment in ICT
and intangibles assets, and in particularly eco-
nomic competencies, has accounted for a fair
part of the difference between sectors that have
shown productivity performance above the
average for the market economy vis-a-vis those
who performed below that. In contrast, we do
not find much evidence that industries which
are relatively intensive on the usage of high skills
show above average performance and there ap-
pears to be signs of a negative impact from the
aging workforce.
We also find that the productivity slowdown
since 2005 has hit the United States even more
than for the average of the European economies
together, especially in manufacturing, even
though the average US productivity growth
rates are still slightly higher than in the EU. In-
dustries that are strong on the intensity of ICT
usage and intangibles have generally experi-
enced smaller slowdowns than those that are
characterized as less intensive on those charac-
teristics. This implies that the prominent produc-
tivity issues in the digital economy have become
more visible on a global scale and are less impor-
tant in distinguishing between US and European
productivity performance. While the United
States remains a clear technology leader in the
digital economy, compared to Europe, the pro-
ductivity effects from the use of that technology
are not superior.
Finally, we find that industries that benefited
most from offshoring trends during the period
1995e2005 experienced bigger slowdowns in
productivity growth since then. This implies
that the slowdown in global trade and possible
impact of a defragmentation of global value
chains on productivity may have been in play
over the past decade.
We emphasize that it is still early days to fully
establish the reasons for the productivity slow-
down, and that more detailed analysis over
time should help to deepen our understanding
of the phenomenon. First, we are still in the
midst of the transition from the Old Digital Econ-
omy (which was characterized by the introduc-
tion of the PC in people’s lives and business
processes, the rise of the Internet, and the begin-
nings of e-commerce) to the New Digital Econ-
omy (which is characterized by the change
toward mobile, ubiquitous access to the Internet,
the storage and usage of data, and advances in
artificial intelligence and robotics). The past
decade of slow productivity growth may be
characteristic of an adjustment process between
two technologies, and a productivity recovery
could therefore be around the corner.
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Second, even if it is just a matter of time for the
effects of the New Digital Economy to show, it is
questionable whether the currently agreed mea-
surement framework for productivity will be
able to pick up the effects of the New Digital
Economy. Most recent studies have argued that
increased mismeasurement of output and pro-
ductivity is unlikely to account for the entire pro-
ductivity slowdown. However, that does not
mean we may not be missing something. Except
for well-known measurement issues related to
price declines of digital assets and services,
which still may account for some underestima-
tion of growth (Byrne et al., 2016), the bigger
measurement issues revolve around how to
handle the impact of free digital content on the
economy. The New Digital Economy may pro-
vide benefits that are not being identified in
GDP or in the productivity accounts. For
example, the user utility of free digital content
is not easily captured in a production cost or
resources-saving framework, including national
and growth accounts. Similarly, output-saving
technical change from consumer technologies
may change the growth effects from digital tech-
nologies (Hulten and Nakamura, 2018). These
measurement issues are currently being debated
by national accounts statisticians and econo-
mists, but their resolution is still some way off.
References
Aghion P, Bergeaud A, Blundell R, Griffith R: Innovation,
firms and wage inequality, Harvard University.
Andrews D, Criscuolo C, Gal P: The best versus the rest: the
global productivity slowdown, divergence across firms and
the role of public policy, OECD Productivity Working Pa-
pers. 5, 2016.
Autor D, Katz LF, Krueger A: Computing inequality: have
computers changed the labor market? Quarterly Journal
of Economics 113(4):1169e1213, 1998.
Bertschek I, Kaiser U: Productivity effects of organizational
change: microeconometric evidence, Management Science
50(3):394e404, 2004.
Bloom N, Jones CI, Van Reenen J, Webb M: Are ideas getting
harder to find, March 2018. Version 2.0.
Bresnahan TF, Brynjolfsson E, Hitt LM: Information technol-
ogy, workplace organization, and the demand for skilled
labor: firm-level evidence, Quarterly Journal of Economics
117(1):339e376, 2002.
Brynjolfsson E, Hitt LM: Paradox Lost? Firm-level evidence
on the returns to information systems,Management Science
42(4):541e558, 1996.
Byrne DM, Fernald JG, Reinsdorf MB: Does the United States
have a productivity slowdown or a measurement
problem? Brookings Papers on Economic Activity Spring
109e182, 2016.
Cette G, Fernald J, Mojon B: The pre-great recession slow-
down in productivity, European Economic Review 88:
3e20, 2016.
Corrado C, Haskel J, Jona-Lasinio C: Knowledge spillovers,
ICT and productivity growth, Oxford Bulletin of Economics
& Statistics 79(4):592e618, 2017.
Corrado C, Hulten C, Sichel DE: Measuring capital and tech-
nology: an expanded framework. In Corrado C,
Haltiwanger J, Sichel DE, editors: Measuring capital in the
new economy, University of Chicago Press, pp 11e46.
Corrado C, Hulten C, Sichel DE: Intangible capital and U.S.
economic growth, Review of Income and Wealth 55:
661e685, 2009.
Fernald JG, Hall RE, Stock JH, Watson MW: The disap-
pointing recovery of output after 2009, Brookings Papers
on Economic Activity 1e58, 2017.
Frosch KH: Workforce age and innovation: a literature
survey, International Journal of Management Reviews 13(4):
414e430, 2011.
G€obel C, Zwick T: Age and productivity e sector differences,
De Economist 160(1):35e57, 2012.
Goldberg PK, Khandelwal AK, Pavcnik N, Topalova P: Im-
ported intermediate inputs and domestic product growth:
evidence from India, Quarterly Journal of Economics 125(4):
1727e1767, 2010.
Halpern L, Koren M, Szeidl A: Imported inputs and
productivity, The American Economic Review 105(12):
3660e3703, 2015.
Harberger A: A vision of the growth process, The American
Economic Review 88(1):1e32, 1998.
Hulten C: Growth accounting. In Hall B, Rosenberg N, edi-
tors: Handbook of the Economics of Innovation, vol. 2. Elsev-
ier, pp 987e1031.
Hulten C, Nakamura L: Accounting for growth in the age of the
internet: the importance of output-saving technical change,
2018. NBER Working Paper No. 23315.
J€ager K: EU KLEMS Growth and productivity accounts, 2017
release, statistical module: description of methodology and
country notes. www.euklems.net.
Jones BF: Age and great inventions, The Review of Economics
and Statistics 92(1):1e14, 2010.
References 93
Jorgenson DW, Fukao K, Timmer MP, editors: The world econ-
omy. growth or stagnation? Cambridge University Press.
Jorgenson DW, Gollop F, Fraumeni B: Productivity and U.S.
economic growth, Cambridge and London, 1987, Harvard
University Press.
Jorgenson DW, Stiroh K: Raising the speed limit: U.S. eco-
nomic growth in the information age, Brookings Papers
on Economic Activity 1:125e211, 2000.
Keller K: International technology diffusion, Journal of Eco-
nomic Literature 42(3):752e782, 2004.
Oliner SD, Sichel DE: The resurgence of growth in the late
1990s: is information technology the story? The Journal of
Economic Perspectives 14:3e22, 2000.
O’Mahony M, Timmer MP: Output, input and productivity
measures at the industry level: the EU KLEMS database,
Economic Journal 119:F374eF403, 2009.
Perez C: Technological revolutions and financial capita: the dy-
namics of bubbles and golden ages, Edward Elgar.
Riley R, Bondibene CR: Winners and losers in the knowledge
economy: the role of Intangible capital, NIESR.
Stiroh KJ: Information technology and the US productivity
revival: what do the industry data say? The American Eco-
nomic Review 92(5):1559e1576, 2002.
Timmer MP, Inklaar R, O’Mahony M, van Ark B: Economic
growth in Europe, Cambridge University Press.
Timmer MP, Erumban AA, Los B, Stehrer R, de Vries GJ:
Slicing up global value chains, The Journal of Economic Per-
spectives 28:99e118, 2014.
Timmer MP, Los B, Stehrer R, de Vries GJ: An anatomy of the
global trade slowdown based on the WIOD 2016 release,
GGDC Research Memorandum 162, 2016.
Timmer MP, Los B, Stehrer R, de Vries GJ: Fragmentation, in-
comes and jobs: an analysis of European competitiveness,
Economic Policy 28:613e661, 2013.
van Ark B: The productivity paradox of the new digital
economy, International Productivity Monitor 31:1e15, 2016.
van Ark B, Inklaar RC, McGuckin RH: ICT and productivity
in Europe and the United States. Where do the differences
come from? CESifo Economic Studies 49(3):295e318, 2003.
van Ark B, J€ager K: Recent trends in Europe’s output and pro-
ductivity growth performance at the sector level, Interna-
tional Productivity Monitor 33:8e23, 2017.
van Ark B, O’Mahony M: Productivity growth in Europe
before and since the 2008/2009 economic and financial
crisis. In Jorgenson DW, Fukao K, Timmer MP, editors:
The world economy. Growth or stagnation? Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, pp 111e152.
van Ark B, O’Mahony M, Timmer MP: The productivity gap
between Europe and the U.S.: trends and causes, The Jour-
nal of Economic Perspectives 22(1):25e44, 2008.
5. European productivity in the digital age: evidence from EU KLEMS94
